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The (Potential) Impact of Brexit on UK SMEs:  
Regional Evidence and Public Policy Implications 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the potential impact of Brexit on UK small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Utilising a major longitudinal survey of UK SMEs, our analysis suggests 
that Brexit related concerns are escalating. Larger, export and import oriented SMEs are 
most concerned, as are those located in major urban and peripheral locations. Among SMEs 
with growth-related plans, many firms are scaling back on capital investment, innovation 
and (especially) exports.  An appraisal of existing policy frameworks suggests that the 
devolved administrations seem better equipped to enact interventions in order to alleviate 
any negative effects arising from Brexit.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper adopts a regional perspective to examine the potential impact and policy 
implications for UK small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of the UK’s decision to leave 
the European Union (EU).  The June 2016 vote to leave the EU (henceforth Brexit) was an 
unprecedented political event with potentially seismic economic and societal consequences 
(Bailey and Budd, 2017).  Owing to its highly politicised, contested and indeterminate nature 
(Jessop, 2017; Lee et al, 2018), Brexit has the potential to dramatically re-write the rules 
governing how UK firms conduct business both domestically and internationally.  Indeed, 
the majority of research suggests Brexit will have substantial negative consequences for the 
UK economy (Bisciari, 2019; Crowley et al, 2019), especially peripheral geographic regions 
(Los et al, 2017a; Cambridge Econometrics, 2018; Chen et al, 2018; Pollard, 2018).i 
Prior research regarding the likely impact of Brexit has often been rather speculative 
(Cumming and Zahra, 2016), sectorally-based (Bailey and De Propris, 2017) and focused on 
larger foreign-owned firms (Dhingra et al, 2017). In contrast, the impact of Brexit for 
entrepreneurship and small business has been largely overlooked within the academic 
literature.ii This is surprising given that SMEs represent a core constitutive part of the UK 
economy and are crucial for job creation, innovation and productivity growth (Nesta, 2017). 
Indeed, the strategic importance of SMEs to the UK economy is underlined by the plethora 
of industrial and regional policy support mechanisms applied at both UK and EU levels 
(McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2016; Bailey and Tomlinson, 2017). 
This paper provides important and novel survey-based evidence regarding the 
potential impact of Brexit on UK SMEs from a regional perspective and discusses the policy 
issues arising therein.iii Specifically, we investigate how concerns across UK SMEs regarding 
Brexit vary by firm size, geographic location, industry sector and firm orientation. We utilise 
the Longitudinal Small Business Survey (LSBS) compiled by the UK Department for Business 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), one of the largest attitudinal surveys of SMEs 
undertaken in the UK. In the immediate aftermath of the EU referendum in 2016, a number 
of specific questions were added to this survey in order to gauge the nature and potential 
impact of Brexit on UK SMEs. These included specific questions asking whether 
entrepreneurs and small business managers perceive exiting the EU as a major obstacle to 
the success of their business.  
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The results of our descriptive analysis suggest that larger, internationally oriented 
and knowledge-based SMEs are particularly concerned about Brexit. SMEs located in key 
urban and peripheral geographic areas are the most concerned regarding the impact of 
Brexit. Moreover, Brexit-induced concerns have amplified considerably over the sample 
period (2016-2017). SMEs with growth-related plans affected by Brexit are scaling down 
their future plans of capital investment, innovation and exports. An analysis of existing 
policy frameworks and support mechanisms suggests that post-Brexit, SMEs are likely to 
face increased challenges related to: access to EU markets; access to finance (via EU 
regional and industrial funding schemes); access to raw materials and labour inputs; and 
increased regulatory barriers. Consequently, we suggest that UK public policy toward SMEs 
requires substantial re-calibration in order to ensure that SMEs are not affected adversely 
by Brexit.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
sources and results of a descriptive analysis. In section 3, we examine the implications of our 
results for four broad areas of public policy. Section 4 provides a summary and highlights 
key policy recommendations. 
2. Empirical Evidence: Unpacking the (Potential) Impact of Brexit on UK SMEs 
SMEs are a core part of the UK economy, accounting for 99% of all firms and 60% of 
total private sector employment (Nesta, 2017). Prior evidence suggests that SMEs 
(especially those with high levels of investment irreversibility) are disproportionately 
impacted by uncertainty given their limited resources and lower resilience to unexpected 
shocks (Ghosal and Ye, 2015). Such uncertainty has been shown to play a key role in shaping 
the decision-making processes of firms (Baker et al, 2016). Brexit therefore is likely to be 
highly salient given its potential to increase uncertainty surrounding the trading conditions 
facing SMEs.  
Due to their financial and human resource constraints, it can be difficult for SMEs to 
undertake the types of contingency planning required to adequately deal with unforeseen 
events such as Brexit. For example, the Confederation of British Industry noted that fewer 
smaller firms have undertaken scenario planning for Brexit relative to larger corporate 
counterparts.iv Moreover, the extent to which SMEs are impacted by Brexit is likely to 
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depend not only on the final terms of any resultant deal between the UK and the rest of the 
EU, but also their geographic location, industry sector and business orientation (especially in 
terms of their levels of internationalisation).  
  The data utilised in the present study is the LSBS produced by BEIS. Our data covers a 
total of 15,867 responses from UK small business owners and managers that were surveyed 
by BMG Research Ltd via computer assisted telephone interviews in 2016 (number of SMEs 
= 9,248) and 2017 (number of SMEs = 6,619). One of the innovative aspects of the 2016 
version of the LSBS was the introduction of a specific question asking whether the UK exit 
from the EU is perceived by entrepreneurs and small business managers as a major obstacle 
to the success of your business in general. This question was also included in the 2017 
version of the survey along with additional Brexit-related questions.  
In the remainder of this section, we use the responses to the LSBS in order to assess 
the type of SMEs that perceive Brexit as a major obstacle to business success. Specifically, 
we assess the views of SMEs by region, industry sector and firm-specific characteristics. 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are used as the primary geographic unit of 
analysis.v We also take advantage of the granular nature of the data and use postcode level 
data to examine the views of SMEs located in peripheral and non-peripheral areas.vi The 
views of SMEs in urban and rural areas are also examined.  
The extent to which SMEs perceive Brexit as a major obstacle to business success is 
summarized in Table 1. In order to conserve space, supplementary data referenced in this 
section are available in an online Appendix. We focus our discussion on the most recent 
data for 2017. Year-on-year changes between 2016 and 2017 are highlighted in Table 1. 
Notably, concerns regarding Brexit have increased (and in some cases markedly) between 
2016 and 2017.vii  
As shown in Table 1, 23.1% (almost a quarter of SMEs) now view Brexit as a major 
obstacle to business success, a significant increase from 16% in 2016. Extrapolating this 
figure to the overall population of SMEs, suggests that over 1.25 million SMEs have 
significant concerns regarding the potential impact of Brexit on business success.viii 
Moreover, and discussed in further detail below, the extent to which SMEs perceive Brexit 
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as a major obstacle to business success varies markedly by location, industry sector and 
business orientation.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Location 
There are notable spatial variations across SMEs regarding whether Brexit is 
perceived as a major obstacle to the success of the business. Levels of concern in Scotland 
(26.1%) and Northern Ireland (23.6%) are slightly above the UK average. Table 1 shows that 
concerns across SMEs regarding Brexit increased considerably in England and Wales 
between 2016 and 2017, but declined slightly in Northern Ireland. However, just under half 
of all medium-sized enterprises in Northern Ireland (42.9%) view Brexit as a major obstacle 
to business success. Corresponding figures for medium-sized enterprises located in England, 
Scotland and Wales are 35.7%, 32.9% and 24.4% respectively. In the specific case of 
Northern Ireland, the views expressed by SMEs are likely to be correlated with the highly 
embedded nature of Northern Ireland within the wider Irish economy, and the ongoing 
concerns regarding arrangements for the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland 
post-Brexit. 
There are also discernible differences between peripheral and non-peripheral 
geographic areas. The proportion of SMEs expressing concerns in peripheral areas is higher 
(25.5%) than counterparts located in non-peripheral areas (22.8%). This holds across almost 
all firm size bands and industries (see Table A1). SMEs operating in production and 
construction industries in peripheral areas are much more concerned (29.3%) about Brexit 
than counterparts located in non-peripheral regions (16.6%). This is unsurprising given the 
heavy reliance on EU nationals in the construction and food manufacturing industries 
(Prelec, 2018).  
Urban SMEs (23.7%) are more likely to perceive Brexit as a major obstacle to 
business success than counterparts located in rural areas (21.8%). Urban SMEs (such as 
those located in London and other major cities) are more likely to be knowledge-based with 
a greater international exposure to markets for human capital, which may partly explain this 
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distinction.ix SMEs operating in service industries located in urban areas appear also much 
more concerned than counterparts located in non-urban areas (See Table A1).  
Sectoral Specialisation 
Prior research strongly suggests certain industries (such as professional services and 
food production) are more likely to be adversely affected than other sectors by Brexit (Los 
et al, 2017b; Prelec, 2018). Our analysis similarly reveals (see Table A1 in the online 
appendix) that there are clear differences between SMEs across broad industry 
classifications. SMEs operating in the distribution and business services sectors express 
greater overall concerns regarding the potential impact of Brexit. Other more locally 
oriented service sector SMEs in the arts, health and education express less concern 
regarding Brexit (see Table A1).  
There are also strong regional variations across industry sectors. For example, 
around one-third of SMEs in the production and construction industries in Scotland view 
Brexit as a major obstacle compared to a mere 17.6% in England. Clearly, the underlying 
drivers of differing perceptions across SMEs are a function of how exposed each industry is 
to EU markets for goods, services and human capital.  
Firm-level Characteristics 
As shown in Table 1, there is a clear positive correlation between firm size and 
concerns regarding Brexit. While on average around a quarter of all SMEs (23.1%) view 
Brexit as a major obstacle to business success, this figure is more than a third for medium-
sized SMEs (35.3%). Conversely, SMEs with zero employees (22%) and micro SMEs 
employing less than 10 employees (26.2%) view Brexit less negatively. These observed 
differences across the firm size distribution are likely to stem from differences in 
international exposure to output and input markets (in terms of exports and imports and 
labour). Exporters and importers relative to non-exporter and non-importer counterparts 
(discussed in further detail below) are more concerned about Brexit by a factor of three to 
one (see Table 1). This is very much an expected finding given the possible disruptions to 
trade resulting from Brexit. The increase in Brexit related concerns across the entire firm 
size distribution accords with other published survey evidence (RSM Brexit Monitor, 2018). 
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It is abundantly clear from the analysis thus far that certain types of SMEs are more 
concerned regarding the impact of Brexit than others. As noted in Table 1, innovators are 
almost twice as likely (31.5%) to view Brexit as a major obstacle to business success 
compared to non-innovators (18.9%).x Concerns across innovative medium-sized ventures 
are even more pronounced with almost 37.4% viewing Brexit as a major concern. It is also 
noteworthy that growth-oriented SMEs (26.7%) are less sanguine regarding Brexit than non-
growth-oriented SMEs (20.2%).xi This suggests that the SMEs often deemed most important 
for driving increases in productivity, such as innovative and growth-oriented SMEs 
(Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) are those with very significant concerns regarding the 
impact of Brexit.  
Export and Import Orientation 
The extent to which SMEs perceive Brexit as an obstacle to business success is likely 
to depend on their level of internationalisation and openness to trade via export and import 
activity. Prior surveys examining the likely impact of Brexit have focused on exporters, while 
importers have been somewhat overlooked. However, approximately two-thirds of 
exporters are also importers, so the two groups are not mutually exclusive (FSB, 2017).  
As show in Table 1, almost double the number of exporting SMEs (40.4%) view Brexit 
as a major obstacle to business success compared to non-exporting counterparts (20.3%). 
This corroborates other recent survey evidence (FSB, 2017). The concerns of exporters are 
more pronounced for those SMEs that export predominantly to the EU (46.7%), but also for 
those who export to non-EU countries (38.1%). The fact that nearly half of UK exporters to 
the EU see Brexit as a major concern suggests that possible changes to the regulatory 
trading environment appear particularly worrisome for both export-oriented SMEs, and for 
those who conduct most of their trade with counterparts located in non-EU countries. These 
concerns are also evident for SMEs that import from EU and non-EU countries. As shown in 
Table 1, 43.5% of SMEs that import view Brexit as a major concern, an increase from the 
32.7% reported in 2016. Levels of concern across SMEs that import from EU and non-EU 
countries are broadly similar, and have increased over time.  
The LSBS dataset allows us to examine the differences in perception of Brexit across 
SMEs according to overall export intensity. In most prior empirical studies of SMEs, 
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exporters and non-exporters are typically delineated in a binary fashion. However, the LSBS 
compiles information on the level of SME export-orientation (measured as the percentage 
of turnover generated by exports). As shown in Figure A1 in the online appendix, SMEs with 
modest levels of exports (equal to less than 5% of their turnover) in peripheral areas are 
considerably more concerned by Brexit (61%) relative to SMEs in non-peripheral areas 
(33.1%). For the most internationalised SMEs (that exports up to 75% of turnover) there is 
considerably more concern regarding Brexit for SMEs located in peripheral locations (45.3%) 
relative to counterparts based in non-peripheral areas (30.5%). This suggests that “distance 
effects” may be at play in shaping Brexit-related concerns across peripheral SMEs. Clearly, 
the evidence above suggests that exporters and importers are likely to be the most heavily 
affected by Brexit, especially those located in peripheral parts of the UK.  
Nature of Concerns and Potential Impact 
 In the discussion thus far, we have examined the types of SMEs that are most likely 
to be affected by Brexit. Table A2 (in the online Appendix) provides an overview of the 
underlying reasons cited by SMEs why Brexit is seen as an obstacle to business success. The 
single largest factor worrying SMEs is uncertainty regarding future regulatory change 
(73.9%). These concerns are more pronounced for micro and small SMEs (80.9% and 80%, 
respectively), exporters (85.8%) and those located in urban areas (76.1%). Other major 
concerns include increased import costs (52.1%) and uncertainty regarding future access to 
EU markets (59.2%). Concerns related to the recruitment of skilled labour were noted by 
around a fifth of SMEs (21%), while 10.4% of SMEs highlighted concerns around recruiting 
unskilled labour.  
 This begs a crucial question: how are these concerns being translated into the future 
investment plans and strategic activities of UK SMEs? Table A3 shows the proportion of 
SMEs with future plans (over the next three years) to undertake growth related activities 
which have been affected by Brexit.xii This clearly shows that the growth-enhancing activity 
most impacted by Brexit is export sales, affecting 34.8% of SMEs but even higher in SMEs 
located in peripheral regions (41.7%).  
Of this sub-sample of SMEs with plans affected by Brexit, the 2017 LSBS asks 
whether future plans will be: scaled up; scaled down; or remain the same. Figure 1 shows 
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that plans for future capital investment have been scaled down by around two-thirds 
(62.3%) of SMEs reporting that Brexit affected their future capital investment plans. 
Similarly, future plans for the development and launch of new products and services, and 
investment in R&D have been scaled down by around two-thirds of the SMEs (see Figure 1). 
The growth-enhancing activity most affected is exports, where plans are being scaled down 
by over three-quarters (77.4%) of SMEs reporting that Brexit affected their future plans to 
increase export sales or begin selling to new overseas markets. Figure A2 shows that the 
timing of these plans has been similarly pushed back by SMEs in equal measure.  
What this evidence clearly shows is that plans for future investment and growth are 
being scaled back for SMEs reporting that Brexit affected their future plans. Scaling back in 
these strategic areas is likely to result in a significant and deleterious impact on the real 
economy in terms of reductions in aggregate investment, employment and output. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3. Public Policy Issues 
The evidence presented above overwhelmingly suggests that location, sector and 
business orientation all shape the perceptions across SMEs of the likely impact of Brexit. 
While the challenges faced by SMEs are likely to change when the UK finally leaves the EU, 
we can see from our analysis these concerns coalesce around the following issues: reduced 
market access and increased costs for imported materials and labour inputs; reductions in 
capital investment; reduced expenditure on innovation; and increased regulatory barriers. 
In order to mitigate any negative effects arising from Brexit, we focus on four key inter-
linked policy domains that could be used to mitigate some of the Brexit related obstacles 
facing SMEs.  
 Regional Policy 
Prior research suggests the negative impact of Brexit will affect different regions 
unevenly (Cambridge Econometrics, 2018; Chen et al, 2018). In line with this, our findings 
suggest SMEs located in peripheral regions under the devolved administrations of Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales appear particularly concerned by Brexit. The process of leaving 
the EU will have a significant direct effect in terms of reduced EU funding to UK regions, a 
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process which is likely to further intensify interregional inequalities (Billing et al, 2019). 
While EU Structural Funding is relatively modest, it remains vitally important for some 
Objective 1 regions such as south Yorkshire and Cornwall (Di Cataldo, 2018).xiii Within 
Scotland, the revitalisation of the Highland region has been attributed to the impact EU 
funding has had in promoting SMEs in new industry sectors such as life sciences and food 
production (McCullough, 2018). According to a spokesperson for the Federation of Small 
Business, SMEs in Wales, North-east and the South-west have become ’very dependent on 
business support funded through structural funds.’xiv Therefore, the withdrawal of EU 
funding post-Brexit is likely to manifest itself in increased calls for a much stronger and more 
robust UK regional policy (Bachtler and Begg, 2017; Bell, 2017).xv  
The EU is a prodigious funder of SMEs via its extensive cohesion policies. The 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is the largest EU financial tool supporting 
SMEs. The ERDF commits 20% of its overall total funding (equating to some €57 million) to 
supporting SMEs (Szczepanski, 2017). These funding streams include various digital 
infrastructure programmes and financial instruments, which have been found to 
disproportionately benefit innovative SMEs (Brown and Lee, 2018). These interventions are 
typified by the current policy prioritisation under the auspices of ‘smart specialisation’, 
which has placed ‘entrepreneurship and SMEs centre-stage’ in EU policymaking (McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés, 2016, p. 537). 
Going forward, there are likely to be a number of critical challenges facing UK policy 
makers tasked with managing the regional impact of Brexit on SMEs. A critical concern is the 
extent of institutional capacity at a sub-national level to assist SMEs. In the devolved 
administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, there are already strong levels of 
institutional capacity to deal with these types of potential shocks (Martin et al, 2016). Given 
the high degree of interdependency between the economies of Northern Ireland and 
Ireland, coupled with the ambiguity surrounding trading arrangements and the Irish border, 
there is likely to be a strong demand for bespoke support for SMEs based in Northern 
Ireland.  
Following the decision in 2011 by the Conservative government to dismantle the 
English Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), the eight English RDAs were replaced with 
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looser business-led Local Economic Partnerships or LEPs (Bailey and Tomlinson, 2017). This 
marked a significant shift from regional-level planning to a more localised and ad hoc focus 
within UK regional policy (Pike et al, 2018). Owing to the way in which LEPs are structured 
and funded, these organisations have little discretionary budget that could be used to assist 
SMEs facing challenges arising from Brexit.  Moreover, the disconnect between LEPs and the 
Department for International Trade makes strategic policy interventions difficult.  In 
contrast, Scotland has implemented bespoke measures (such as the provision of additional 
subsidies) to SMEs impacted by Brexit.  
Observers have speculated on the need for a more ambitious UK regional policy 
post-Brexit (Pollard, 2018). The UK government has committed itself to creating a Shared 
Prosperity Fund to offset the decline in EU Structural Funds. While there have been calls for 
this to be targeted towards “inclusive growth” there is scant detail of how this will benefit 
SMEs across the UK.xvi What seems certain, is that much greater levels of devolved 
autonomy are likely to be required in order to provide regions with the power and 
discretionary funding to mitigate any negative economic impact arising from Brexit. It seems 
unlikely that this could occur without a much greater redistribution of devolved powers 
across the UK, especially to English regions which currently have very limited institutional 
capacity to deal with Brexit (Martin et al, 2016; Billing et al, 2019).  
International Trade Policy  
Our analysis suggests that exporting and importing SMEs are most concerned about 
Brexit. Much of the debate surrounding the pros and cons of Brexit centre upon on trade 
related issues (FSB, 2017; Balls et al, 2018). Proponents of Brexit generally view the UK 
departure from the EU as an opportunity to pursue an independent trade policy. To achieve 
this, the UK would have to leave the Single Market and European Customs Union. 
Opponents of Brexit portray a much gloomier picture whereby the UK could lose access to 
the world’s largest economic zone resulting in a major disruption to its trading regime.  
The bulk of survey evidence suggests that most SMEs express a strong preference for 
retention of UK membership of the Single Market and EU Customs Union.xvii For most SMEs, 
maintaining frictionless and borderless trade is paramount (FSB, 2017). SMEs also express 
reservations regarding the potential impact of tariffs and customs controls post Brexit (Balls 
 
12 
 
et al, 2018). Increased costs are a particular concern for SMEs embedded within complex 
EU-wide supply chains (FSB, 2017). SMEs located in Northern Ireland are likely to be 
particularly affected in this regard given that many products cross the Irish border several 
times during the manufacturing process (Nesta, 2017).xviii  
Overall, available evidence suggests that SMEs remain unconvinced of the potential 
opportunities arising from the pursuit of an independent trade policy (Balls et al, 2018). 
Given the likely destabilisation caused by extended and incomplete negotiations or long-
term transitional arrangements, it is important that UK policy makers put provisions in place 
to mitigate any negative impacts of Brexit for SMEs who trade internationally.  
Given the acute concerns expressed by SMEs who trade internationally there may be 
both short and longer-term policy interventions that could help overcome some of the 
potential issues surrounding Brexit. In terms of the former, transitional support could be 
offered to exporters. This could take a similar form to an existing scheme operating in 
Scotland offering a small subsidy to SMEs exporting to the EU.xix However, this scheme 
targets exporters only, and provides no support to importers who may also incur additional 
costs during any transition following Brexit. Another useful transitional measure would be 
the development of a national telephone or online helpline to help assist SMEs navigate this 
turbulent period with information about new customs arrangements or regulatory 
procedures emerging in the current opaque environment. The CBI has advocated such a 
measure so that “small businesses can get questions answered quickly” but to date no such 
measure has been enacted by the UK government.xx  In contrast, a dedicated telephone 
support helpline service has been established by the Scottish government and heavily 
resourced with 100 staffxxi.  
In terms of longer-term strategic forms of assistance to encourage SME 
internationalisation, UK policy makers may have to implement a more expansive and well-
resourced overarching export strategy. To that end, the UK government has recently 
launched a new export strategy.xxii A key aim of this aforementioned strategy is the 
acknowledgement that while less than one in ten UK SMEs currently exports, almost the 
same number (an estimated 300,000 SMEs) has the capacity to become internationalised. 
While encouraging these “dormant” or “discouraged” exporters seems a laudable policy aim 
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in light of Brexit (Kalafsky and Brown, 2018), SMEs have highly varied capabilities and 
support needs, so interventions need to be carefully targeted (Wright et al, 2007).  
In order to overcome the deep-seated reservations among SMEs toward greater 
internationalisation, a considerable uplift in institutional capacity across the UK is required. 
While, the devolved administrations such as Scotland have the institutional capacity to 
undertake this type of strategic targeted activity, the LEP network, which operates 
throughout England (in its current form), is resourced insufficiently to undertake this 
strategic role. The RDAs by contrast, were much better equipped to make sound 
judgements about these types of locally customised support needed for local sectors (Bailey 
and Tomlinson, 2017). It would appear that in future the development of greater regional 
institutional capacity across England will also need to be augmented with much greater 
levels of support for SMEs around export development.  
Industrial Policy  
Given their large degree of international exposure, high-tech growth-oriented and 
innovative SMEs appear particularly concerned by Brexit. These firms have attracted 
considerable attention from policy makers in recent years, evidenced by the UK 
government’s industrial strategy (Building our Industrial Strategy), which emphasises the 
need for more growth-oriented firms (BEIS, 2017).  
Many growth-oriented SMEs find access to finance a significant obstacle. Brexit 
could exacerbate these matters further via a reduction in funding to SMEs by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). It has been reported that funding from the European Investment 
Fund (which is majority-owned by the EIB) to the UK SMEs declined by 91% in 2016.xxiii 
Consequently, Brexit is likely to have “dire consequences” for funding new ventures and 
start-ups (Cumming and Zahra, 2016, p. 690). Indeed, recent survey evidence suggests that 
around one third of UK SMEs expect greater difficulties accessing finance post-Brexit (British 
Business Bank, 2019). Moreover, the UK government has been criticised by the banking 
community for not implementing contingency measures to prevent a credit crunch and/or 
loan defaults if a disorderly Brexit occurs.xxiv   
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While overall equity investment levels have not diminished across the UK as a whole 
since the Brexit vote, peripheral geographic areas may be disproportionately affected.xxv 
Financial instruments such as public-sector venture capital schemes are a core part of EU 
industrial policy for developing equity markets especially in peripheral UK regions such as 
the North East of England, Scotland and Wales (Brown and Lee, 2018). Indeed, start-ups in 
areas such as Newcastle (in the North-east of England) have benefited significantly from EU 
funding (IPPR et al, 2018) leading one study to suggest that Brexit ‘could be catastrophic for 
investment into high-growth businesses’ in the North-East region (Beauhurst, 2016, p. 14). 
At the time of writing, it remains unclear as to whether the UK government will replace 
these instruments with like-for-like alternatives etc.  
It is likely that the twin effects of increased uncertainty and reduced access to EU 
funding could heighten concerns across growth-oriented SMEs. Future industrial policy is 
therefore likely to play a powerful role in offsetting any negative impact of Brexit. The 
strong focus on growth-oriented SMEs within the UK Industrial Strategy seems appropriate 
given these firms are likely to be the most negatively affected by Brexit.  
Nevertheless, Brexit offers UK policy makers much greater latitude in reforming 
industrial policy without having to adhere to strict EU state-aid requirements (Crafts, 2017). 
In this context, some have advocated enhanced capital allowances for SMEs embedded in 
supply chains heavily affected by Brexit (Bailey and De Propris, 2017). These types of 
targeted bespoke interventions are likely to be critical for stimulating capital investment and 
alleviating chronic levels of uncertainty, especially given the reductions in planned capital 
expenditures reported in Figure 1.  
Immigration Policy 
Immigration is undoubtedly the most controversial and contested policy area 
surrounding Brexit (Lee et al, 2018). In recent years, many UK growth-oriented SMEs have 
overcome labour shortages by employing EU nationals. Any Brexit-induced migration 
reduction could potentially damage access to appropriate labour inputs, with resultant 
effects on output and productivity (Portes and Forte, 2017). However, the results of a recent 
survey of 600 companies across the UK suggests that reduced access to labour since the 
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referendum has led to increased automation, which in turn could benefit longer-term 
productivity.xxvi  
Across the UK as a whole, EU nationals now account for one in ten UK manufacturing 
jobs (Miller, 2016). Indeed, the use of EU migrant labour has become prevalent in low paid 
and labour-intensive sectors such as food production (McCollum and Findlay, 2015). A 
recent study of the Scottish seafood-processing sector finds that approximately two-thirds 
of employees in this sector originated from EU countries, such as Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania (Prelec, 2018). This could help explain the high levels of concern regarding Brexit 
in peripherally based export-intensive SMEs (see Figure A1). Urban areas such as London 
also rely heavily on low cost sources of EU labour in sectors such as construction (Miller, 
2016).xxvii  
SMEs located in these types of labour intensive industries may suffer major human 
capital resource constraints if alternative (non-EU) sources of labour cannot be accessed. 
Moreover, few if any SMEs have dedicated human resource management policies, and often 
adopt very piecemeal and reactive strategies in relation to these issues. Consequently, 
finding alternative sources of labour supply may prove disruptive, especially for SMEs 
located in peripheral regions.  It is for these reasons the Scottish Government has 
campaigned vigorously for the devolution of immigration policy (Scotsman, 2018).xxviii  
Brexit may also affect the supply of skilled labour (IPP, 2018). According to a recent 
survey, almost 70% of creative industries firms employ EU nationals (Creative Industries 
Federation, 2017). Given the concentration of this sector in the South East, this may be an 
explanation behind the very high levels of concern expressed by SMEs in urban areas, 
especially those in the ICT and creative media sectors in London. Reduced access to talent 
has also been expressed by FinTech SMEs, prompting some to open offices elsewhere in the 
EU.xxix A recent study by a UK think tank calls on the UK government to implement a less 
stringent and more transparent visa policy in order to help high-tech London start-ups 
recruit sufficient high-tech talent (IPPR, 2018). Organisations such as the UK ScaleUp 
Institute and the City UK lobby group have similarly advocated the need for new fast-track 
visas to aid the supply of high-tech talent. While these seem sensible steps, given the 
uneven requirements for human capital across the UK, greater devolution of immigration 
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policy seems a logical step to help ameliorate any negative consequences of Brexit for 
different industries and regions.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines the potential impact and policy implications of Brexit for UK 
SMEs.  Concerns amongst SMEs regarding the impact of Brexit on business success have 
amplified considerably over the time period examined (i.e. 2016 to 2017). Medium-sized, 
knowledge-based and internationally oriented SMEs are among those most concerned by 
Brexit, as are those located in urban areas such as London and peripheral parts of the UK. In 
terms of its impact, the ramifications for those affected by Brexit are potentially very 
detrimental and wide-ranging, especially in terms of future capital investment and export 
plans. This corroborates other evidence which suggests that Brexit is likely to negatively 
impact those firms (such as innovators and exporters) with the highest levels of productivity 
(Bank of England, 2018). 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests there is now an urgent and 
compelling need for a much more coherent and coordinated policy response from the UK 
government to allay the specific problems besetting SMEs.  As discussed within the paper, 
this will probably necessitate a raft of different policy measures across the policy domains 
examined.   Encouragingly, albeit rather belatedly, the UK government appears to 
acknowledge the particular concerns of SMEs as exemplified by the planned inception of a 
business council aiming to specifically examine the opportunities for SMEs post-Brexit.xxx  
We conclude that any new policy frameworks will need to be accompanied by 
significantly increased political autonomy and institutional capacity, especially in the 
peripheral regions of England.  Worryingly, the UK’s sub-national governance system 
appears largely unprepared for the forthcoming challenges post-Brexit (Billing et al, 2019).  
Ironically, while concern regarding Brexit is considerably higher in geographic areas 
overseen by devolved administrations, it is in jurisdictions such as Scotland which may be 
the best equipped to deal with any negative ramifications (via devolved powers and existing 
institutional frameworks). 
Given the intensely politicised nature of Brexit, it is imperative future policy 
interventions and institutional arrangements are properly evidence-based. As the UK’s 
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departure from the EU beckons and Brexit-induced uncertainty intensifies further, more 
research is urgently required in order to help policy makers navigate this unprecedented 
and profoundly turbulent economic and political period.  
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ii
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iii
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iv
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v
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analysis by government office region. 
vi
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comprising a sizeable area, we cannot guarantee that SMEs examined in peripheral regions are representative 
of the overall population of UK SMEs.  
vii
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the incorporation of a longitudinal dimension to the 
descriptive analysis.  
viii
 Based on the UK SME population of 5,490,470 this roughly equates to 1,268298 SMEs. 
ix
 While lower than in urban areas, between 2016 and 2017, there was a marked uplift in concern in rural 
SMEs.  
 
x
 Innovators are firms that have conducted either product (introduced any new or significantly improved goods 
or services) or process (introduced any new or significantly improved processes for producing or supplying 
goods or services) innovation in the last three years. 
xi
 Growth-oriented SMEs are firms that aim to grow their sales over the next three years.  
xii
 The proportion of the overall sample of SMEs reporting that their future plans have been affected by Brexit 
is as follows: capital investment = 14.7%; plans to develop and launch new products & services = 15.2%; 
investment in R&D = 14.4%; and increase export sales or begin selling to new overseas markets = 34.8% (see 
Table A3).  
xiii
 Objective 1 regions are those with GDP per capita lower than 75% of the EU average. These regions receive 
the highest forms of funding under EU Cohesion policy.  
xiv
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-smes-
start-ups-scale-ups/Lord-Whitty-to-Kelly-Tolhurst-MP-250718.pdf 
xv
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xvii
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xviii
 According to data from the LSBS, SMEs in Northern Ireland rely on EU markets (53% only export to the EU) 
for their exports to a much greater extent than there English (27% only export to the EU) or Scottish (19% only 
export to the EU) counterparts (Nesta, 2017).  
xix
 The pilot scheme launched in Scotland enables eligible SMEs a subsidy of £4,000 to assist with exporting to 
EU markets.  
xx
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Table 1. Brexit as a major obstacle to the success of the business in general (% of SMEs) 
 
 
All Sample 
Size  
No employees Micro 1 - 9 Small 10 - 49 Medium 50 - 249 
 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
England 15.4% 22.9% 14.2% 21.9% 18.3% 25.8% 23.1% 27.4% 29.7% 35.7% 
Scotland 21.2% 26.1% 20.9% 24.7% 21.3% 29.0% 23.9% 32.3% 24.3% 32.9% 
Wales 16.3% 22.3% 15.5% 19.4% 17.3% 28.9% 25.3% 38.3% 27.4% 24.4% 
Northern Ireland 25.0% 23.6% 22.0% 20.6% 31.9% 29.9% 36.1% 37.8% 43.9% 42.9% 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 16.0% 23.1% 14.8% 22.0% 18.9% 26.2% 23.6% 28.5% 29.6% 35.3% 
Non-peripheral regions 15.9% 22.8% 14.7% 21.5% 19.2% 26.3% 23.6% 28.7% 29.7% 34.7% 
Peripheral region 16.4% 25.5% 15.6% 25.3% 17.1% 25.8% 23.2% 26.7% 29.2% 39.8% 
Rural 12.9% 21.8% 11.6% 20.8% 16.5% 24.6% 17.8% 24.8% 31.0% 33.4% 
Urban 17.2% 23.7% 16.0% 22.4% 19.9% 27.0% 25.7% 29.9% 29.3% 35.9% 
Non-exporter 13.6% 20.3% 13.0% 19.5% 15.0% 22.7% 18.0% 23.0% 23.9% 29.3% 
Exporter 33.2% 40.4% 30.1% 39.2% 38.1% 42.2% 40.6% 44.6% 41.1% 45.3% 
Exporter to EU countries  36.6% 46.7% 34.0% 46.1% 40.3% 48.3% 41.5% 46.0% 41.5% 46.3% 
Exporter to non-EU countries 31.6% 38.1% 27.5% 35.0% 38.3% 43.5% 39.4% 43.0% 37.7% 45.9% 
Non-importer 13.5% 19.8% 12.9% 19.1% 15.0% 22.2% 17.6% 22.6% 22.7% 27.5% 
Importer 32.7% 43.5% 29.5% 43.5% 38.1% 43.0% 40.1% 45.1% 40.7% 47.0% 
Importer from  EU countries  37.7% 49.0% 36.1% 50.7% 40.3% 46.5% 40.2% 47.2% 42.5% 47.6% 
Importer from  non-EU countries  28.2% 40.7% 23.7% 39.4% 34.9% 41.5% 44.4% 48.0% 39.8% 45.6% 
Non-innovator 12.2% 18.9% 11.3% 18.0% 14.8% 21.4% 17.9% 25.1% 25.7% 32.7% 
Innovator 23.9% 31.5% 22.6% 30.7% 25.9% 33.4% 30.0% 32.5% 33.0% 37.4% 
Non-growth-oriented SMEs 11.0% 20.2% 10.5% 20.4% 13.0% 19.3% 16.2% 21.2% 26.5% 30.5% 
Growth-oriented SMEs 21.2% 26.7% 20.3% 24.4% 22.3% 31.0% 25.8% 30.8% 30.1% 36.0% 
Note: Figures are calculated using survey weights. 
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Figure 1: How the scale of SMEs’ future plans have been be affected by Brexit (% of SMEs) 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figures are only for 2017 and SMEs with specific future growth-related plans (over the next three years) 
affected by UK exit from the EU. Figures are calculated using survey weights. 
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Table A1. Brexit as a major obstacle to the success of the business in general (% of SMEs) 
 
Broad Sector  
ABCDEF - Production 
and Construction 
GHI - Distribution: 
Transport/ Retail and Food 
service / Accommodation 
JKLMN - Business 
services 
PQRS - Other services 
 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
England 11.7% 17.6% 15.8% 24.5% 20.6% 28.8% 11.2% 18.5% 
Scotland 15.7% 29.2% 15.8% 27.4% 29.4% 25.2% 20.6% 22.3% 
Wales 16.7% 20.2% 25.6% 28.6% 10.1% 23.8% 13.9% 17.0% 
Northern Ireland 30.8% 19.1% 26.7% 40.1% 31.8% 24.9% 4.8% 13.3% 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 12.9% 18.5% 16.5% 25.3% 20.9% 28.4% 11.8% 18.6% 
Non-peripheral regions 11.6% 16.6% 17.2% 24.6% 21.5% 28.3% 11.3% 19.5% 
Peripheral region 20.6% 29.3% 12.7% 29.1% 15.0% 29.2% 16.3% 11.4% 
Rural 14.9% 25.7% 13.1% 19.1% 13.8% 24.2% 8.1% 14.0% 
Urban 11.8% 14.3% 18.1% 28.1% 23.4% 30.0% 13.0% 20.1% 
Non-exporter 11.3% 17.0% 13.4% 20.5% 18.1% 25.0% 10.6% 17.9% 
Exporter 35.1% 35.9% 36.7% 47.9% 32.0% 41.2% 30.5% 27.3% 
Exporter to EU countries 31.4% 37.2% 38.6% 49.9% 38.9% 49.3% 29.9% 42.0% 
Exporter to non-EU countries 39.8% 34.3% 37.6% 48.5% 28.9% 35.6% 21.3% 31.2% 
Non-importer 11.2% 15.6% 10.5% 19.8% 19.0% 25.8% 10.7% 16.4% 
Importer 26.6% 39.9% 41.4% 48.3% 32.3% 42.1% 24.9% 44.1% 
Importer from  EU countries  30.8% 40.7% 45.5% 53.7% 37.2% 47.6% 33.3% 58.7% 
Importer from  non-EU countries 24.9% 43.9% 35.6% 43.7% 29.4% 38.3% 16.8% 38.4% 
Non-innovator 10.2% 15.3% 13.3% 22.9% 16.2% 22.1% 8.4% 15.9% 
Innovator 20.4% 30.7% 25.3% 31.1% 28.0% 36.9% 18.6% 23.0% 
Non-growth-oriented SMEs 9.4% 17.3% 9.8% 22.4% 16.0% 26.2% 7.4% 14.1% 
Growth-oriented SMEs 18.1% 20.7% 23.2% 28.8% 25.0% 30.6% 16.4% 24.0% 
Note: ABDE – Primary, C – Manufacturing, F – Construction, G - Wholesale/ Retail,  H - Transport/ Storage,  I - Accommodation/ Food,  J- Information/ Communication, KL - Financial/ Real estate, M - Professional/ 
Scientific, N - Administrative/ Support, P – Education, Q - Health/ Social work, R - Arts/ Entertainment, S - Other services. Figures are calculated using survey weights.  
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Reasons given by SMEs that cited Brexit as an obstacle to business success (% SMEs) 
 
 
 
 
Difficulty in 
recruiting skilled 
labour 
Difficulty in 
recruiting 
unskilled labour 
Increase 
in import 
costs 
Decrease in 
investment 
Uncertainty about 
future regulatory 
changes 
Uncertainty about 
future access to EU 
markets 
Anything 
else 
England 21.8% 10.4% 52.2% 40.7% 74.1% 59.2% 9.6% 
Scotland 19.2% 12.4% 52.4% 32.4% 76.3% 61.9% 10.3% 
Wales 7.5% 5.0% 52.2% 30.6% 61.5% 54.1% 1.1% 
Norther Ireland 19.5% 12.5% 51.1% 34.3% 76.2% 57.2% 15.1% 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 21.0% 10.4% 52.1% 39.6% 73.9% 59.2% 9.5% 
No employees 17.3% 7.7% 50.7% 39.6% 71.3% 57.8% 10.6% 
Micro 1 - 9 28.2% 15.1% 55.2% 40.2% 80.9% 64.1% 7.2% 
Small 10 - 49 38.4% 23.8% 58.8% 37.9% 80.0% 56.2% 3.3% 
Medium 50 - 249 54.0% 38.5% 60.3% 34.6% 77.8% 62.4% 3.4% 
ABCDEF 21.2% 8.8% 67.7% 34.1% 63.4% 54.4% 8.1% 
GHI 15.5% 11.4% 73.6% 35.6% 74.9% 56.5% 8.4% 
JKLMN 22.6% 7.8% 36.1% 42.8% 80.1% 65.1% 8.4% 
PQRS 23.7% 16.9% 45.2% 43.4% 70.7% 54.4% 14.7% 
Non-peripheral regions 22.2% 10.4% 50.2% 39.6% 75.1% 61.0% 9.1% 
Peripheral region 14.0% 10.3% 64.3% 39.4% 66.0% 47.8% 11.7% 
Rural 18.7% 11.0% 54.7% 35.0% 68.2% 52.4% 10.7% 
Urban 22.0% 10.2% 51.0% 41.4% 76.1% 61.8% 9.0% 
Non-exporter 21.3% 12.0% 48.9% 42.0% 69.9% 50.4% 9.2% 
Exporter 20.2% 5.6% 62.4% 32.3% 85.8% 86.0% 10.3% 
Exporter to EU countries 21.3% 5.7% 68.1% 31.9% 87.7% 87.9% 8.8% 
Exporter to non-EU countries 22.5% 5.3% 68.4% 32.1% 85.7% 89.4% 10.1% 
Non-importer 20.6% 10.4% 43.6% 39.9% 71.2% 52.4% 10.2% 
Importer 22.2% 10.3% 76.2% 38.7% 81.5% 78.3% 7.3% 
Importer from  EU countries 20.2% 8.3% 78.2% 33.9% 79.5% 78.6% 7.0% 
Importer from  non-EU countries 23.4% 10.1% 73.0% 47.0% 86.6% 78.7% 8.8% 
Non-innovator 19.7% 11.0% 50.5% 36.2% 67.5% 49.1% 8.7% 
Innovator 22.6% 9.7% 54.1% 43.7% 81.5% 71.2% 10.3% 
Non-growth-oriented SMEs 17.4% 9.5% 49.8% 37.7% 69.8% 52.2% 10.8% 
Growth-oriented SMEs 24.5% 11.2% 54.4% 41.4% 77.7% 65.8% 8.2% 
Note: The figures are only for 2017 and SMEs that regarded EU exit as an obstacle to business success. ABDE – Primary, C – Manufacturing, F – Construction, G - Wholesale/ Retail,  H - Transport/ Storage,  I - 
Accommodation/ Food,  J- Information/ Communication, KL - Financial/ Real estate, M - Professional/ Scientific, N - Administrative/ Support, P – Education, Q - Health/ Social work, R - Arts/ Entertainment, S - 
Other services. Figures are calculated using survey weights. 
 
 
 
Table A3. SMEs with future plans to undertake specific growth-related activities over the next three years affected by Brexit (% of SMEs) 
 
 
Capital investment (in premises, 
machinery etc.) 
Develop and launch new 
products/services 
Invest in 
R&D 
Increase export sales or begin 
selling to new overseas markets 
England 14.5% 15.6% 15.0% 35.8% 
Scotland 11.0% 14.3% 12.1% 29.9% 
Wales 20.0% 10.7% 9.9% 13.4% 
Norther Ireland 20.1% 10.9% 3.3% 42.5% 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 14.7% 15.2% 14.4% 34.8% 
No employees 14.8% 14.7% 13.7% 33.4% 
Micro 1 - 9 14.3% 17.4% 16.9% 39.2% 
Small 10 - 49 15.9% 13.1% 14.2% 29.8% 
Medium 50 - 249 12.2% 9.0% 10.9% 29.7% 
ABCDEF 16.5% 10.5% 7.5% 20.0% 
GHI 15.9% 17.5% 26.7% 45.5% 
JKLMN 13.7% 15.7% 13.6% 36.2% 
PQRS 12.6% 16.5% 15.7% 31.0% 
Non-peripheral regions 13.6% 14.5% 13.9% 33.7% 
Peripheral region 21.2% 20.9% 19.7% 41.7% 
Rural 18.3% 13.8% 14.8% 34.2% 
Urban 12.7% 15.9% 14.2% 35.0% 
Non-Exporter 14.6% 13.3% 12.7% 29.7% 
Exporter 15.2% 21.5% 19.1% 36.4% 
Exporter to EU countries 17.2% 21.7% 22.1% 36.4% 
Exporter to non-EU countries 18.4% 18.7% 16.7% 38.6% 
Non-Importer 12.6% 13.2% 13.0% 30.6% 
Importer 21.1% 21.1% 17.3% 39.9% 
Importer from  EU countries 20.4% 20.0% 19.2% 42.4% 
Importer from  non-EU countries 23.1% 20.6% 16.7% 38.5% 
Non-Innovator 13.3% 12.6% 11.5% 32.0% 
Innovator 16.0% 16.7% 15.7% 35.9% 
Non-growth-oriented SMEs 15.5% 17.9% 17.9% 35.0% 
Growth-oriented SMEs 14.4% 14.5% 13.2% 34.8% 
Note: The figures are only for 2017 and SMEs which planned to undertake specific growth-related activities over the next three years.  ABDE – Primary, C – Manufacturing, F – Construction, G - Wholesale/ Retail,  H 
- Transport/ Storage,  I - Accommodation/ Food,  J- Information/ Communication, KL - Financial/ Real estate, M - Professional/ Scientific, N - Administrative/ Support, P – Education, Q - Health/ Social work, R - 
Arts/ Entertainment, S - Other services. Figures are calculated using survey weights.
 
 
Figure A1. Brexit as a major obstacle to the success of the business by export intensity in 2017 
(Percentage of overall turnover accounted for by goods or services exports) (% of SMEs) 
 
 
Note: Figures are calculated using survey weights. 
 
 
 
Figure A2: How the timings of SMEs’ future plans have been be affected by Brexit (% of SMEs) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are only for 2017 and SME with specific future growth-related plans (over the next three years) 
affected by UK exit from the EU. Figures are calculated using survey weights. 
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